

***United States Court of Appeals
for the
District of Columbia Circuit***



**TRANSCRIPT OF
RECORD**

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Court of Appeals, District of Columbia

OCTOBER TERM, 1911.

822

No. 2293.

SAMUEL W. CURRIDEN, APPELLANT,

vs.

FRANK L. MIDDLETON, HENRY S. BLACKMORE, AND
WILLIAM G. ORR.

APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA.

FILED MAY 3, 1911.

Nov. 6th 1911
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In the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.

No. 2293.

SAMUEL W. CURRIDEN, Appellant,

vs.

FRANK L. MIDDLETON et al.

a Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.

In Equity. No. 29257.

SAMUEL W. CURRIDEN, Complainant,

vs.

FRANK L. MIDDLETON, HENRY S. BLACKMORE, and WILLIAM G. ORR, Defendants.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
District of Columbia, ss:

Be it remembered, That in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, at the city of Washington, in said District, at the times hereinafter mentioned, the following papers were filed, and proceedings had, in the above-entitled cause, to wit:

1 *Bill of Complaint.*

Filed April 4, 1910.

In the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.

In Equity. No. 29257.

SAMUEL W. CURRIDEN, Complainant,
against

FRANK L. MIDDLETON, HENRY S. BLACKMORE, and WILLIAM G. ORR, Defendants.

To the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, holding an Equity Court:

The complainant states as follows:

1. The complainant, Samuel W. Curriden, who brings this suit in his own right, and all the defendants are citizens of the United States;

the complainant and the defendant, Frank L. Middleton, are residents of the District of Columbia, the defendant Blackmore is a citizen of New York and the defendant Orr is a citizen of Maryland.

2. During the year 1904 and many years prior thereto a personal friendship existed between the complainant and the defendant Middleton, which was maintained and developed by their social intercourse and common interest in many subjects. Said defendant was a patent attorney in the active practice of his profession. The complainant was engaged in various other business affairs, and by his personal labor and industry had accumulated a moderate fortune of about thirty-five thousand dollars, and had ample financial credit, which facts were well known to the defendant Middleton, in whose integrity and loyalty as a friend and in whose professional knowledge and skill as a patent attorney the complainant had entire confidence.

3. During the early part of October, 1904, the defendant Middleton, through the defendant Orr, who was then a stranger to the complainant, brought to the attention of the complainant a certain fluid called Aromaform and a certain apparatus intended as an automatic appliance in the use of said fluid, and represented to the complainant that said fluid was a powerful and valuable disinfectant, the invention of one Henry S. Blackmore; that said fluid and apparatus were patented; that the defendant Middleton was the agent of the owners of all the patents covering said fluid and apparatus, with power to make a sale of said patents and all rights thereunder and incident thereto; that there had been various complications of ownership; that previously to that moment it had been impossible to completely purchase said patents and rights and that there was a present opportunity to make such purchase which should not be neglected. Further to engage the interest and confidence of the complainant in the enterprise the defendant Middleton, through said defendant Orr, exhibited to the complainant a copy of a letter written and signed by Harvey W. Wiley, Chemist of the Agricultural Department of the United States, which letter is as follows:

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,
BUREAU OF CHEMISTRY,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

I have in use one of the apparatus invented by Mr. Henry S. Blackmore for a disinfectant and deodorizer.

By this invention four distinct and important results are secured:

1. It impregnates the water with aerated disinfectant.
2. It disinfects the soil and urinary deposits from the closet or urinal to the sewer.
3. It disinfects the room or apartments with aerated disinfectant escaping at exposed points.
4. It leaves communicating with the atmosphere in the basin and trap of the urinal a liquid impregnated with disinfectant.

From the above considerations it seems to me that this is a most useful and simple process, and one which can be easily introduced at

a low rate of expense into private houses and public buildings with great benefit.

H. W. WILEY.

4. The complainant at first declined to take any part in the enterprise because of his ignorance of chemistry and want of skill or knowledge in matters of mechanical devices, but his objections were overcome by further representations then made to him by the defendant Middleton as follows: That the patentee, the defendant Blackmore, stood very high in his profession as chemist; that the patents carried very broad and exclusive claims; that said defendant Middleton was agent of Blackmore, and of Orr and certain parties in Baltimore holding certain rights by assignment from Blackmore under said patents; that he had a standing offer of \$5,000 for such rights for the cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul; that about 500 of said automatic machines were then in use in the District of Columbia and orders had been received for about 200 more; that the said Baltimore parties and Orr had given certain responsible business men in Washington an option to purchase their said rights, which option was about to expire, but that, as a favor to the complainant and his friend, Joseph E. Crandall, also a friend of the defendant Middleton and who also listened to the defendant Middleton's presentations aforesaid, such option would not be renewed; that the formula of said fluid was known only to Blackmore, its inventor, patentee and sole owner, and the fluid could be made at a certain chemical establishment in New York City, where, under Blackmore's own eye, the various ingredients were assembled and the fluid compounded; that because of Blackmore's financial needs at that time and of disagreements among the Baltimore parties aforesaid all the rights under said patents could be purchased through the defendant Middleton as agent of the said owners and upon terms decidedly favorable to the purchaser; that such purchaser would thus secure, by such acquisition and unification of all interests, a property which the defendant Middleton described as the most valuable franchise that ever passed through his office; that the complainant and Crandall ought to act promptly in securing said rights while Blackmore was offering the same at very low rates during his temporarily pressing financial needs; that immediate payment of only a small part of the purchase price would be required and a considerable part thereof would be accepted in stock of any company that complainant and Crandall might organize to carry on the enterprise; and that a true and correct statement of the workings of said apparatus and of the efficiency and effects of said fluid was as follows:

"An attractive transparent chamber with a nickel-plated cap or top, which is attached to the down-pipe through which the water passes from the flushing tank to the closet bowl or urinal beneath. In the transparent chamber is placed Aromaform—a disinfecting, sterilizing germicide. Every flushing action has the effect of drawing air through the Aromaform. In its passage the air is thoroughly impregnated with the disinfecting quality and odor of the material; it thence passes into the down-pipe, where

it aerates the flushing water, and as this water is discharged into the bowl the room is disinfected and deodorized, while the water in the bowl is thoroughly sterilized."

5. Yielding to the solicitations of the defendant Middleton and relying upon his representations aforesaid and other representations to the same end, by him made and believing all of them to be true, the complainant, after an agreement between himself and Crandall to make the purchase on their joint account, agreed with the defendant Middleton to make such purchase of all said rights, payment to be part in cash and part in stock of a company to be organized by them under the laws of the District of Columbia and capitalized at \$500,000, the terms of the purchase to be as follows:

Rights purchased.	Cash and notes.	Stock.	Total.
From H. S. Blackmore for 35 per cent., with right to buy remaining 65 per cent. of all manufacturing rights on terms stated	\$3,500.00		\$3,500.00
From Baltimore parties of all selling rights outside the District of Columbia.....	20,000.00	\$20,000.00	40,000.00
From W. G. Orr, selling rights to D. C....	7,500.00	7,500.00	15,000.00
Totals	\$31,000.00	\$27,500.00	\$58,500.00

In pursuance of the agreement aforesaid the contemplated company was duly incorporated under the laws of said District by the name of American Automatic Disinfectant Company.

6. On October 27, 1904, the complainant paid said defendant the sum of \$200, and on the next day the further sum of \$1,300, for which the defendant Middleton receipted in writing signed by him "Frank L. Middleton, Agent," and the complainant paid further sums of money and made his promissory notes and incurred indebtedness amounting in all to about \$40,000 in the purchase of said rights and in the performance of said agreement with the defendant Middleton and in the purchase for \$8,000 in money of Blackmore's remaining 65 per cent. interest—at all times relying upon the representations made by the defendant Middleton as aforesaid, which said rights the complainant and said Crandall duly transferred to the said company.

7. The said company thereupon attempted to engage in the main business for which it had been created, being the manufacture and sale of the fluid and automatic apparatus aforesaid. A
5 suitable building was secured by lease and therein, under the supervision and direction of said Blackmore, a laboratory equipment was purchased and put in place, to the end that the parts of the apparatus procured from various manufacturers elsewhere could be therein properly assembled and, further, that therein Aromaform could, under all necessary conditions, be economically compounded under said Blackmore's instructions in conformity to the correct

formula, the right to use the name Aromaform having been also acquired by said Company from said Blackmore.

8. Mr. Frank S. Bright became president, the complainant Curriden treasurer, Joseph E. Crandall general manager, the defendant Middleton a trustee and the defendant Blackmore a trustee and consulting chemist of the Company.

An elaborate prospectus was prepared and printed and other arrangements necessary to make and vend the Aromaform and apparatus were made by the Company.

9. Efforts were made to increase the local business in Washington, although it was found that the number of machines in place in that city was much less than had been represented by the defendants, and of these a large proportion had been the subject of complaint for reasons which had been kept concealed from the complainant and Crandall.

10. A purchase of the rights for New England was considered and nearly consummated by Boston parties of experience in the sale of disinfecting appliances, who placed full faith in the representations of the defendants, and they offered advantageous terms for the rights in that territory.

11. By these and other prospective purchasers of rights confirmation was asked of the representations made by the Company in its printed matter, based on the statements of the defendants, as to the efficiency of the fluid and apparatus for the purposes stated by them, and the complainant, with the general manager, Crandall, was compelled to set on foot inquiries and to have tests made concerning the Aromaform, the result of which proved that the fluid, with the apparatus, was wholly ineffective and utterly worthless for the uses for which it was designed.

12. The complainant while thus heavily distressed and burdened also became broken down with sickness and after he had exhausted his means, credit and health he gave up the struggle and was
6 obliged to resign as treasurer of the Company. Mr. Bright also resigned as president; Mr. Crandall vainly continued for only about a year. The defendant Middleton became the president and at the next stockholders' meeting caused the complainant to be dropped from the board of trustees and thereafter the defendant Middleton became and continued, down to the present time, to be in sole and complete control of the Company and all of its assets and property of every kind and of all of its documents and other records.

13. The complainant in January, 1906, being incapacitated by his labors in the premises and his disappointment and anxiety caused by the unfortunate results of his reliance upon the defendant's misrepresentations aforesaid, and also being in ill health and wholly exhausted in his property and credit, and utterly unable to meet the remaining obligations signed by him and unpaid, sent the following letter to Crandall:

JANUARY 3, 1906.

MY DEAR MR. CRANDALL: I repeat to you my proposal of December 28th last and will extend the time for its acceptance to ten days

from this date, with privilege of renewal if desired not exceeding thirty days from date. The proposal is as follows:

The 737 shares of A. A. D. Co. stock in your name which belongs to me as collateral, together with 486 shares of like stock in my own name, I agree to surrender to you on your order at any time within ten days from this day on the following conditions:

1. That all unpaid notes signed by me and given on account of purchase, which I think are as follows, viz:

J. C. Lewis	for \$400	and interest.
W. G. Orr	" 1440	" "
Do.	" 3000	" "
Do.	" 750	" "
— — Fowler	" 1875	" "
F. L. Middleton	" 2300	" "
— — Thomas	" 151.20	

shall be returned to me cancelled and paid.

2. That the four accommodation notes of A. H. Galt to my order and amounting to \$2,290 and interest shall be returned to me cancelled and paid, said Galt to agree that in consideration of the assignment to him by me of all indebtedness of the Company to me

7 for moneys advanced and for services to date he shall release all other claim- he may have against me in connection with this enterprise. I hereby agree to continue my endorsement of renewals of said notes from time to time as such notes may become due, the curtailment of each note not to be less than \$50.

3. That the accommodation note of yourself to my order amounting to \$800 be paid by you and cancelled.

4. That the several notes of the Company and of others discounted for the benefit of the Company bearing my personal endorsement be cancelled and paid.

The intent of this proposition being that I shall be at the earliest possible moment relieved of all liability of every sort for all obligations of mine now outstanding given by me in connection with the affairs of the American Automatic Disinfectant Company upon the surrender by me of all interests therein belonging to me, except the 300 shares, which are to remain in my hands.

Very truly yours,

SAMUEL W. CURRIDEN.

Mr. J. E. Crandall.

14. On January 16, 1906, the secretary of the Company by letter informed Mr. Crandall that the foregoing offer of the complainant would be accepted, and on the same day Mr. Crandall by letter transmitted to the complainant a copy of the secretary's letter. The formal action of the Company was taken on January 18, as follows:

Meeting of the Board of Trustees of the American Automatic Disinfectant Company.

JANUARY 18, 1906.

Present all trustees save S. W. Curriden and Henry S. Blackmore, the president presiding.

On motion of F. S. Bright,

Resolved, That the Company, in consideration of the sum of one dollar to it in hand paid and other good and valuable consideration to it from S. W. Curriden, agrees to save said S. W. Curriden on any and all notes made by him for the benefit of said Company and now outstanding, and that as to said notes or as to any notes of said Company indorsed by said Curriden he shall for the future be considered as only an accommodation endorser or maker, and as rapidly as said notes can be curtailed they shall be, and when finally paid they shall be returned to said Curriden. Put and carried.

On motion of F. S. Bright, it was further resolved that the note of Joseph E. Crandall for eight hundred dollars now held by the Commercial National Bank, on which S. W. Curriden is endorser, and certain notes of Alexander H. Galt, amounting to \$2,290 and endorsed by said Curriden, having been given for the benefit of and to carry on said Company, shall be assumed by said Company and when curtailed shall be, when finally paid, returned to said Curriden; and that a certain note of W. G. Orr, of which said Curriden is maker, is the note of said Company, and that said Curriden as to said note is only an accommodation maker, and said Company agrees to save him harmless therefrom and when finally paid to return the same to said Curriden, said last named note being for the sum of \$775 and being now held by the Farmers' and Mechanics' National Bank. Put and carried.

(Signed)

ALEXANDER H. GALT.
J. E. CRANDALL.
F. S. BRIGHT.
CLAUDE N. BENNETT.
F. L. MIDDLETON.

Attest:

ALEXANDER H. GALT, *Secretary*.

15. The foregoing agreement was fully complied with by the complainant and all the acts thereby required of him were duly performed, but said Company, under the control and management of the defendant Middleton, has failed to perform said terms on its part required, but has on the contrary wholly failed to pay certain notes, which are substantially in the amounts following:

A. H. Galt at the Commercial National Bank \$175, A. H. Galt at the Metropolitan National Bank \$125, J. E. Crandall at the Commercial National Bank \$450, W. G. Orr at the Farmers' and Mechanics' National Bank \$650, Speare, Middleton & Speare at the American National Bank \$400, and at the International Banking Company \$200, making about \$2,000 in all.

16. The notes last above mentioned being still outstanding and unpaid, on some of them the complainant has been sued and on others he is threatened with suit. The total sum of his liability in the premises, which by the acceptance by said Company of the terms of said letter the Company was to assume, was about \$13,000, which, if it had been taken care of by the Company, would have left the losses of the complainant about \$30,000; but the Company became and now is wholly and hopelessly insolvent.

17. The complainant further charges that not only did the defendant Middleton fail to fully comply with his agreement signed on the 18th of January, 1906, and not only did he endeavor to make the losses by the notes aforesaid, amounting to about \$2,000, fall upon the complainant in addition to his prior losses of about \$30,000, but on the 13th day of May, 1908, he also caused to be presented to the complainant a demand for \$6,080, alleged to be unaccounted for and due from him as late treasurer of the Company, and threatened him with a lawsuit to collect the same through E. Hilton Jackson, his attorney.

After investigation by the complainant it was shown to the defendant Middleton's attorney that none of the claim of \$6,080 was due by the complainant, but that the accounts of the Company correctly stated would show an indebtedness to the complainant for cash advanced and not repaid him of \$450.

But thereafter the defendant Middleton, for the continued purpose of intimidation, caused to be made another audit by a different set of experts, and upon the results of their incomplete and imperfect labors made a demand, reduced from the original one but amounting to \$2,139.04.

Upon examination by the complainant of the papers which he was allowed to see on the occasion of this claim newly stated, it was at once shown to one of the experts that none of the \$2,139.04 was due from the complainant, but that the \$450 (less \$150 from a clerical error in favor of the complainant) was due to him, being \$300; and thereafter said claim was abandoned by its authors.

18. The complainant is informed and believes and charges that in the course of the events hereinbefore recited the most essential misrepresentations made to him and the said Crandall by the defendants Middleton, Blackmore and Orr were in substance and effect as follows:

(a) That the said Middleton was interested in the sale of the patent rights of Blackmore aforesaid only as an attorney expecting a moderate and reasonable fee, whereas in truth and in fact the said Middleton was then otherwise interested in the said patent rights and had formed a plan to receive a large portion of the moneys from any sale which might be made thereof to the complainant.

10 (b) That in going forward with the new enterprise deferred payments to all parties could be met from sales of rights to use the Aromaform and apparatus, which sales were already in sight; that a standing offer to purchase for \$5,000 the rights for Minneapolis and St. Paul had been received, whereas no such offer had been made; that for New York and Pittsburg and other places

there were negotiations pending which could be quickly consummated; that in particular there was good reason to be sure that rights could be sold for \$45,950 at the places and prices following, namely:

Wilmington, Del., \$500; Philadelphia, Pa., \$8,500; Baltimore, Md., \$4,000; Boston, Mass., \$4,500; Richmond, Va., \$750; San Francisco, Cal., \$2,500; Minneapolis, Minn., \$1,500; Milwaukee, Wis., \$2,000; Louisville, Ky., \$1,000; Atlanta, Ga., \$500; Savannah, Ga., \$500; Chicago, Ill., \$10,000; Hartford, Conn., \$500; Indianapolis, Ind., \$1,200; Detroit, Mich., \$2,000; New Orleans, La., \$2,000; St. Louis, Mo., \$4,000; whereas nearly all the foregoing representations were in substance false; such negotiations as existed were mainly merely inquiries made by Mr. Middleton; and substantially nothing had been accomplished in the way of selling rights.

(c) That the name of Chief Chemist Harvey W. Wiley could be used in promoting the new enterprise, whereas it had been understood and agreed by the defendants with said Wiley that his name should not under any circumstances be made public or used in connection with the letter which had been given for a special purpose only, for a money consideration, and with the above understanding and agreement.

(d) That the patent rights which were being sold and were to be the basis of the business and the profits of the Company which was to be organized were the rights to use a fluid newly discovered by the defendant Blackmore, which was not merely a deodorizer or the creation of one odor to mingle with and disguise another odor but was a fluid which when used in the apparatus had germicide power, which could change the nature of poisonous substances, destroy their unhealthfulness and by disinfecting them make them harmless; whereas in truth and in fact this fluid had, as used in the apparatus, no disinfecting or germicide power whatever, but only had an odor which might overcome other odors; and such fluid was utterly worthless for the real purposes for which it was designed to use and sell it; all of which facts the defendants Middleton, Blackmore and Orr ever well knew.

11 19. The complainant avers that all the acts of the defendants hereinbefore recited were parts of a conspiracy formed by them to deceive and defraud the complainant, by inducing him to purchase the aforesaid patent rights of the said Blackmore and to organize a company to use and vend the same; that the complainant and the said Crandall were the dupes and victims of the said conspiracy and they were deluded agents and instruments of the said defendants in organizing said company and in all the subsequent proceedings thereof; and that the said Company was itself an agency and instrumentality for fraud in all directions of the said defendants, and especially of the said defendant Middleton, for which he is personally responsible to the complainant and many other persons who have invested and lost money in connection with the aforesaid patent rights of the said Blackmore.

20. The complainant further avers that all the books and papers of the said Company are in the possession and control of the defendant Middleton; that the great bulk of all papers at any time pos-

essed by the complainant were turned over to said defendant and cannot now be examined or produced by the complainant, and that it will be impossible for the complainant adequately to prove the deceptions and wrongs practised upon him by the defendants without a discovery by them of facts within their sole possession or that of their servants and agents pertinent to the subject-matter of this bill.

Wherefore the complainant, being without adequate remedy at law, prays:

I.

That process may issue requiring the defendants Frank L. Middleton, Henry S. Blackmore and William G. Orr, and each of them, to appear and answer this bill of complaint and to make suitable disclosure of all the facts herein charged and all others that may be pertinent to the complaint.

II.

That upon such disclosure and the appearance of the truthfulness of the facts charged in this bill of complaint the complainant may have due relief afforded him in this court; that it may be adjudged as to the defendants that they have fraudulently deprived the complainant of all his property as aforesaid and that it may be ordered

and decreed that they shall make due restitution thereof to the complainant by paying to him the amounts of money by him paid out as aforesaid; also for such other relief as may be just.

SAMUEL W. CURRIDEN,
Complainant.

L. A. BAILEY,
WM. E. CHANDLER,
Counsel for Complainant.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ss:

I, Samuel W. Curriden, do solemnly swear that I have read the foregoing bill of complaint by me subscribed and know the contents thereof; that the facts therein stated upon my personal knowledge are true and those therein stated upon information and belief I believe to be true.

SAMUEL W. CURRIDEN.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 25th day of September, A. D., 1909.

[NOTARIAL SEAL.]

GEO. H. CAMPBELL,
Notary Public, D. C.

13

Demurrer.

Filed May 3, 1910.

* * * * *

The demurrer of Frank L. Middleton, the defendant, to the bill of complaint filed herein by Samuel W. Curriden, on to-wit, the 4th

day of April, A. D., 1910, and the defendant, Frank L. Middleton by protestation not confessing nor acknowledging all, or any of the matters and things in said petition contained to be true in manner and form as the same are set forth therein, doth demur thereto, and for causes for demurrer shows:—

1. That the complainant hath not in said bill stated such a case as doth or ought to entitle him to any such relief as is thereby sought and prayed for from or against this defendant.

2. Because the allegations in said bill set forth on their face establish the fact that if the complainant hath any right of action at all against this defendant, it is not such a right of action as is enforceable in a Court of Equity.

3. That the complainant has improperly conceived the forum in which he seeks to have enforced against this defendant, the said alleged cause of action being cognizable, if at all, in a Court of Law.

4. Because the allegations in said bill establish that the complainant has lost whatever remedy he may have had against this defendant because of laches.

14 5. Because the allegations in said bill establish that the complainant has lost whatever remedy he may have had against this defendant because said claim is completely barred by the Statute of Limitations applicable to the claim therein set forth.

6. Because the said allegations disclose that the alleged fraud and misrepresentations of the defendant did not mislead the complainant, who as will appear from a persual of said bill, had with this defendant equal means of knowledge of all the affairs of the American Automatic Disinfectant Company.

7. Because the allegations in said bill fail to set forth in form or in substance such acts of fraud against this defendant as to require him to make answer thereto.

8. Because all the allegations in said bill are so vague, indefinite and inconclusive as to make it impossible for this defendant to make proper answer thereto.

Wherefore, and for other good causes of demurrer in said bill contained, this defendant prays judgment, whether he shall be compelled to make any further or other answer to such petition demurred to as aforesaid.

E. HILTON JACKSON,

Attorney for Defendant Frank L. Middleton.

Messrs. L. A. Bailey, and William E. Chandler, Attorneys for Complainant:

15 Please take notice that the foregoing motion has been calendared for hearing on Friday, May the 13th, at 10 a. m., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be conveniently heard.

E. HILTON JACKSON,

Attorney for Defendant Frank L. Middleton.

Order Sustaining Demurrer and Granting Leave to Amend.

Filed November 18, 1910.

* * * * *

This cause coming on to be heard upon the demurrer of the defendant, Frank L. Middleton, and after argument of the same by counsel for the respective parties hereto, and due consideration by the Court, it is, this 18th day of November, A. D., 1910, ordered, adjudged and decreed that the demurrer herein be, and the same is hereby sustained, with leave to the plaintiff to amend within twenty days.

By the Court:—

WENDELL P. STAFFORD, *Justice.**Amendment to Original Bill of Complaint.*

Filed December 24, 1910.

* * * * *

To the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia holding an Equity Court the complainant states:

That by leave of Court he makes an amendment of his
16 original bill of complaint filed on the 4th day of April, A. D. 1910 which amendment is as follows:

I. The complainant repeats and makes more distinct and direct his averment that the defendant Middleton deceived him into believing that the said Middleton had no property-ownership or interest in the said patents and rights which the defendants were trying to sell and that he was acting only as Agent for the patentees to help sell the said patents and rights, whereas the Complainant has since been informed and believes and so avers that in truth and in fact the said Middleton was the owner of a large interest in said patents as well as in the rights granted by Blackmore thereunder and that as such owner he was to receive a large portion of the money and stock which might be obtained by selling said patents and rights by means of concealments from and fraudulent representations to the complainant; and the Complainant says that the payments made by him after he had been enticed into purchasing the patents were largely received and retained by said Middleton, namely:

Of the first payment to said Middleton for said Blackmore of \$3500 he retained money due from Blackmore to Middleton or his firm amounting to not less than \$1300, as the complainant has been informed;

Of the \$20,000 paid by the Complainant for rights purchased from the Baltimore parties Middleton received not less than \$3800
17 in addition to a stock interest in the new company; and

Of the \$7500 paid for rights from Orr, Middleton was to receive not only \$500 in cash but credits on other transactions of sales of like character, said Orr having been associated with Middle-

ton in many ways of which the Complainant had no knowledge at the time,—the exact amounts of credits and cash so received by said Middleton out of the amounts so paid by the Complainant are unknown to the Complainant.

And the Complainant avers that if he had not supposed that Middleton was only an Agent and had known that he was in fact the owner as above stated in large part of the patents and the rights thereunder he would not have entered in any way into the purchase nor would he have assumed any obligations or paid any money toward the purchase of the patents or any rights thereunder.

II. The Complainant avers that the defendant Middleton had full knowledge that there was no standing offer of \$5000 for rights to use the patents in Minneapolis and St. Paul and yet represented to the complainant that there was such an offer; and further represented that there was a certainty of the sales of rights for large amounts in various other places, whereas in truth and in fact there were no offers made from such places, and the complainant avers that, if it had not been for these representations of the said Middleton, he would not have taken part in the purchase of the
18 patents and rights in the ways described in said original bill of complaint.

III. The Complainant repeats and makes more distinct and direct one of the frauds practiced upon him by the defendants in stating that the patented fluid, Aromofom, to be used in the patened apparatus was not merely a deodorizer but a disinfectant, and the complainant avers that the defendant Middleton distinctly stated to him that the Aromofom was a disinfecting, sterilizing germicide, so that the water treated in the closet bowls became thoroughly sterilized; whereas in fact the fluid was only a deodorizer and not a disinfectant and as used in the apparatus had no sterilizing property and the falsity of this representation was the principal cause of non-success of the company organized on Mr. Middleton's persuasion.

IV. The complainant avers that in the progress of the deceits practiced upon him concerning the real ownership of the patents and rights thereunder, the alleged offers to buy rights to use the same, the prescribed non-user of Chief Chemist Wylie's letter and the use of aromofom as a disinfectant and not merely as a deodorizer, the principal deceiver and chief conspirator was the defendant Middleton, that the organization of the American Automatic Disinfectant Company was only his creation of an agency for his purpose, and in its whole course was only a one-man corporation, designed, pressed
19 forward and utilized by him to aid in deluding the complainant and others, inducing him and them to assume liabilities and obtaining from him and taking to himself the large sums of money which the complainant was led to advance.

V. The complainant avers that the facts set out in the original bill of complaint and in this amendment are extremely complicated and that a proper investigation thereof would be long and difficult; that the books, papers, documents and records from which the facts can be ascertained passed into the possession of the said Middleton when he dropped the complainant from the board of directors of the

American Automatic Disinfectant Company, and that an examination thereof is indispensable to enable anyone to unravel the complications of facts bearing upon the question of the frauds alleged against the defendants.

VI. The complainant further avers that while from such careful investigations as he has been able to make, with the evidence accessible to him, he has been led to believe and continues to believe the truth of all the foregoing averments and those of the original bill of complaint, and that the defendant Middleton has been guilty of such frauds and fraudulent representations as made him personally liable to the complainant for all his advancements, payments and losses in connection with the purchase of said patents and rights thereunder yet the complainant was not and is not sufficiently sure of the facts to make him willing to begin an action at law and invoke a trial by jury; wherefore he determined to seek further enlightenment by means of disclosures to be required of the defendants Middleton, Blackmore and Orr.

VII. The complainant avers that he was duly advised by counsel whom he consulted that being in doubt whether the facts known to him would give him a complete right of action, based upon the alleged frauds committed by the defendants, and realizing that such facts and others connected therewith were complicated and ascertainable only from an examination of books and papers in the possession of the defendants, and by disclosures as aforesaid, therefore he was entitled to the assistance of a court of equity to obtain a disclosure by the defendants, in due course, of all pertinent facts and to obtain access to such books and papers and make an examination thereof, and entitled after and in connection with such disclosure and examination to have a full and accurate accounting made by the defendants concerning all complicated and fraudulent transactions which might be disclosed, wherefore the complainant brought the original bill of complaint and now files this amendment thereof by way of addition thereto.

VIII. The complainant in further pursuance of the discovery by him in Section 20 of his original bill declared to be necessary in order to enable him to prosecute his case asks that as to the defendants the Court will order that they, upon their several and respective Corporal oaths, and according to the best and utmost of their several and respective knowledge, remembrance, information, and belief may make full, true, direct and perfect answer to the several interrogatories hereinafter stated and numbered as follows:

1. Whether the defendant Middleton in procuring the issue of the Blackmore patents or either of them sold to Curriden, or his firm, or any agent of either, sought the aid of Professor Harvey W. Wiley?

2. When and by whom the certificate of Professor Wiley mentioned in the bill was first brought to his attention and under what circumstances?

3. Whether he gave or caused to be given to the complainant a copy of the Wiley certificate?

4. Whether at the time of the sale to Curriden he knew that the Wiley certificate related not to the fluid but solely to the apparatus?
5. Whether he knows where the original of that certificate now is; where did he last see it?
6. Whether he told the defendant Orr or any person that Wiley's name could not be used in connection with the certificate, and if so when and where?
7. Whether he told the complainant at any time that the Wiley certificate related solely to the apparatus and not to the fluid? If so when and where?
8. Whether he or his firm gave any aid in securing the issue of the patents or either of them from the Patent Office?
9. Whether he first had his attention called to the patents or either of them only after they were issued; and whether then by the defendant Blackmore; if not by Blackmore by whom?
10. Whether as agent for Blackmore or Orr or the parties in Baltimore he ever made effort to secure a purchaser previous to the sale to Curriden and Crandall; if so with whom and what were the terms of any negotiations?
11. Whether his books or the books of his patent-law firm show the sale of the patents to Curriden and Crandall, and if so whether he will allow an inspection thereof by the complainant's counsel?
12. Whether he knows and will furnish the names and present address- of the Baltimore parties holding all the selling rights outside of the District of Columbia under the Blackmore patents at the time he sold them to Curriden and whether he will furnish the names and present address- of all who were associated with him in the transaction?
13. Whether he was present at the meetings of the stockholders of the American Automatic Disinfectant Company held in the years 1906 and 1907, and if so whether he voted at either meeting for directors, stating the number of shares then standing in his name and the number he then voted on?
14. How many shares of stock of the company are now outstanding, and in whose name, and what changes if any in ownership has taken place since the beginning of the present suit? And how many shares, if any, of the stock he owns in addition to those standing in his name?
15. Whether he had any agreement or understanding with the defendant Blackmore or others owning interests in the patents concerning the sale thereof or of any rights thereunder; if so with whom and what were the terms of said agreements and what portions if any of the proceeds of such sales were to be paid to him for his own use and benefit? If any such agreements are in writing where and in whose possession are they?
16. Whether he has at any time received for himself money or other things of value in connection with the sales to Curriden of the aforesaid patents and rights thereunder and with the organization and business of said company, either personally or as an agent or attorney, giving dates and amounts?
17. Whether he or his firm ever received an offer of \$5000 for

rights under the Blackmore patents for the Cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul; and whether he ever had any knowledge of such an offer to any person or any offer for these rights. If any such offer was made in writing where is it now to be seen and what are the names and residences of the parties?

18. Whether he has knowledge of any sales of rights or of any interest in the American Automatic Disinfectant Company since Curriden was dropped from its board, and if so to whom such sales were made and the terms of the transaction and if the books of the com-

24 pany show such transaction or negotiations to that result will he cause them to be left in the hands of the Clerk of this Court for the inspection of the complainant with liberty for him, his attorney or agents to take copies thereof or extracts therefrom.

19. Whether he had caused to be made any tests of the fluid or of the apparatus before the sale was made by him as agent to Curriden and Crandall; if so when and by whom?

20. Whether he ever learned at any time of any bacteriological tests of aromoform made by any public health officer or by any well known chemist, and if so when, by whom, and with what result?

21. Whether a certain description of the apparatus and aromoform was ever brought to his attention and if so when,—the description being as follows:

“An attractive transparent chamber with a nickel-plated cap or top, which is attached to the down-pipe through which the water passes from the flushing tank to the closet bowl or urinal beneath. In the transparent chamber is placed Aromoform—a disinfecting, sterilizing germicide. Every flushing action has the effect of drawing air through the Aromoform. In its passage the air is thoroughly impregnated with the disinfecting quality and odor of the material; it thence passes into the down-pipe, where it creates the flushing water, and as this water is discharged into the bowl the room is disinfected and deodorized, while the water in the bowl is thoroughly sterilized.”

22. Whether he had knowledge of bacteriological tests
25 made by Dr. E. G. Seibert, a chemist of this City, of aromoform, and of the apparatus, this under the instruction and with the assistance of the defendant Blackmore; and whether he ever made effort to learn the result of the tests made by Dr. Seibert?

23. Whether he opposed the making of tests by Dr. Seibert of aromoform and if so for what reason did he deem any tests beyond the certificate of Dr. Wiley necessary? And whether he ever made effort to learn of the result of the tests made by Dr. Seibert?

24. Whether he has seen the defendant Blackmore since the filing of this suit and if so when and where?

25. Whether the defendant Blackmore owed him or his firm anything at the time the patents were sold to Curriden and Crandall; if so how much and for what?

26. Whether he has seen the defendant Orr since the filing of this suit and if so when and where?

27. Whether he was in any wise connected with the transaction

in which the defendant Orr became a purchaser of rights under the Blackmore patents afterwards sold to Curriden and, if so, how connected and if as agent, for whom?

28. Whether he advised the defendant Orr to become interested in the enterprise?

The complainant specifies of the foregoing interrogatories such as are not necessary to be answered by the defendant Blackmore, numbered as follows: 1 to 28 both inclusive, and 32 to 34 which follow, both inclusive, and he prays that said defendant Blackmore may be required to specially answer:

29. Whether he or his attorney secured from Prof. Wiley the certificate described in the bill; if not by whom was such certificate secured, for what purpose, and where can it now be seen?

30. And whether the patents or either of them owned by him and sold to Curriden were prosecuted to allowance by the defendant Middleton or the firm of which he is a member; if not who, if any, was his attorney before the Patent Office?

31. And whether there were infringements brought to his knowledge in the use of said patented aromaform or apparatus sold to Curriden, and if so what, if anything of prosecution was done by him or by any others interested with him in the ownership?

The complainant specifies of the foregoing interrogatories such as are not necessary to be answered by the defendant Orr numbered as follows: 1 to 31, both inclusive, and he prays that said defendant Orr may be required to specially answer

32. When and by whom the Blackmore apparatus or fluid or either of them was first brought to his attention; what rights thereto he ever obtained, and if so, when and to what extent, from whom he bought them and through what agents and what amount was paid or agreed upon and in what form and from whom and to whom

27 was the consideration to proceed and did proceed in the beginning?

33. Whether he had knowledge of the Wylie certificate and if so when and by whom was it first brought to his attention and under what circumstances?

34. And whether he has negotiated to sell rights owned by the Company or any interest in either since Curriden was dropped from the Board; if so who were the parties, what were the terms agreed upon, the payments made, if any, and whether or not the defendant Middleton had knowledge of these negotiations?

IX. The complainant informs the court that the original bill has never been served upon the defendants Blackmore and Orr; that, although they often frequented Washington before the bill was filed, the complainant has not been able to learn of their presence here since that time but he has sent to them by mail copies of the bill.

X. The complainant also informs the court that after the original bill was prepared and before it was filed an Agreement of Arbitration between the complainant and the defendant Middleton was duly signed on the 23rd day of December, 1909, covering all the matters in controversy between them, under which agreement one arbitrator was to be appointed by each party and the two were to select a third,

28 and the complainant duly appointed Mr. Hannis Taylor and the defendant Middleton appointed Mr. E. Beverly Slater, but the two have not been able to agree upon the third arbitrator.

Wherefore the complainant now prays this court in this proceeding to take jurisdiction of the Agreement of Arbitration and to appoint the third arbitrator therein.

And for the relief specially prayed in said original bill and also for general relief as therein prayed.

SAMUEL W. CURRIDEN,
Complainant.

LORENZO A. BAILEY,
WM. E. CHANDLER,
Counsel for Complainant.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ss:

I, Samuel W. Curriden, do solemnly swear that I have read the foregoing amendment to the original bill of complaint by me subscribed and know the contents thereof; that the facts therein stated upon my personal knowledge are true and those therein stated upon information and belief I believe to be true.

SAMUEL W. CURRIDEN.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23d day of December A. D. 1910.

[SEAL.]

GEORGE H. CAMPBELL,
Notary Public, D. C.

29 *Demurrer to Amended Bill of Complaint.*

Filed December 30, 1910.

* * * * *

The demurrer of Frank L. Middleton, the defendant, to the amended bill of complaint filed herein by Samuel W. Curriden, on to-wit, the 24th day of December, A. D., 1910, and the defendant, Frank L. Middleton, by protestation not confessing nor acknowledging all, or any of the matters and things in said amended bill contained to be true in manner and form as the same are set forth therein, doth demur thereto, and for causes for demurrer show:—

1. That the complainant hath not in said amended bill stated such a case as doth or ought to entitle him to any such relief as is thereby sought and prayed for from or against this defendant.

2. Because the allegations in said amended bill set forth on their face establish the fact that if the complainant hath any right of action at all against this defendant, it is not such a right of action as is enforceable in a Court of Equity.

3. That the complainant in said amended bill has improperly conceived the forum in which he seeks to have enforced against this defendant, the said alleged cause of action being cognizable, if at all, in a Court of Law.

4. Because the allegations in said amended bill establish that the complainant has lost whatever remedy he may have had against this defendant because of laches.

30 5. Because the allegations in said amended bill establish that the complainant has lost whatever remedy he may have had against this defendant because said claim is completely barred by the Statute of Limitations applicable to the alleged claim therein set forth.

6. Because the allegations in said amended bill disclose that the alleged fraud and misrepresentations of the defendant did not mislead the complainant, who, as will appear from a perusal of said amended bill, had with this defendant equal means of knowledge of all the affairs of the American Automatic Disinfectant Company.

7. Because the allegations in said amended bill fail to set forth in form or in substance such acts of fraud against this defendant as to require him to make answer thereto.

8. Because all the allegations in said amended bill are so vague, indefinite and inconclusive as to make it impossible for this defendant to make proper answer thereto.

Wherefore, and for other good causes of demurrer in said amended bill contained, this defendant prays judgment, whether he shall be compelled to make any further or other answer to such petition demurred to as aforesaid.

E. HILTON JACKSON,

Attorney for Defendant Frank L. Middleton.

31 Messrs. L. A. Bailey and William E. Chandler, Attorneys for Complainant:

Please take notice that the foregoing motion has been calendared for hearing on Friday, January 6th, A. D., 1911, at 10 A. M., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be conveniently heard.

E. HILTON JACKSON,

Attorney for Defendant Frank L. Middleton.

Opinion of the Court.

Filed February 20, 1911.

* * * * *

This case has been heard upon demurrer to the bill as now amended. There was a demurrer to the original bill which was sustained and the bill adjudged insufficient. Thereupon, with leave of court, the plaintiff filed amendments, and the present demurrer is to the bill as thus amended. Broadly stated, the plaintiff's claim is that the defendants have deprived him of his property by fraud and deceit, and should be ordered to restore to him the amounts of money he has paid out by reason thereof, and should be required to make a full disclosure touching all matters charged in the bill. The only decree sought is a money decree. The principal objection made to

the bill under the demurrer is that the case as set forth in the
32 bill is a proper case for an action at law for deceit, where full relief can be had, and that consequently there is no ground for the jurisdiction of a court of equity.

The original bill sets out that in the year 1904, and for many years prior thereto, a personal friendship had existed between the plaintiff and the defendant Middleton; that Middleton was a patent attorney in active practice; that plaintiff was engaged in various other business affairs and had accumulated some Thirty-five thousand dollars, and had ample financial credit. That these facts were known to Middleton; that the plaintiff had entire confidence in Middleton's loyalty as a friend and in his knowledge and skill as an attorney; that in October 1904, Middleton, through one Orr, another of the defendants, who was then a stranger to the plaintiff, brought to the attention of the plaintiff, a certain fluid called Aromaform, and a certain apparatus intended as a disinfecting appliance in the use of said fluid, and made certain representations to the plaintiff touching the power and value of said fluid as a disinfectant, and touching the invention and patenting of said fluid and apparatus, and representing that Middleton was the agent of the owners of all the patents covering said fluid and apparatus, with power to make a sale of the same and the rights thereunder, and representing that there had been various complications of ownership so that up to that moment it had been impossible to completely purchase said patent rights, and that now the opportunity to purchase the same should not be neglected. That further to engage the interest and
33 confidence of the plaintiff, Middleton through Orr, exhibited to the plaintiff a copy of a certain letter, written and signed by Harvey W. Wiley, Chemist of the Agricultural Department of the United States, which is set out in the bill, and which is to the effect that he, the said Wiley, was using one of the apparatus and that four distinct and important results were thereby secured, from which said Wiley inferred and believed that the process was useful and simple, and one that could be easily introduced at a low rate into private houses and public buildings, and would be a great benefit. That at first the plaintiff being distrustful by reason of his ignorance and want of skill in such matters, declined to take any part in the enterprise, but that his objections were overcome by further representations of Middleton which are set out in the bill at considerable length, and which relate to the value of the fluid and apparatus, and the various advantages that would result from the enterprise. That yielding to the solicitations of Middleton, the plaintiff and one Crandall, a friend of the plaintiff, agreed with Middleton to purchase all said rights, to be paid for, partly in cash and partly in stock of the company to be organized by them with a capital of Five hundred thousand dollars. That in pursuance of the agreement, the company was duly incorporated. That in the same month, plaintiff paid Middleton \$1500., for which Middleton receipted as agent, and thereafter the plaintiff paid further sums and gave his notes, incurring an indebtedness of some forty thousand
34 sand dollars in carrying out said enterprise, and all such rights were transferred to said company. That thereafter the com-

pany attempted to engage in the business for which it had been created, namely, the manufacture and sale of the fluid and apparatus. That a building was secured by lease and one Blackmore, the inventor of the fluid and apparatus, who is also a defendant, was put in charge of the laboratory. That one Bright was made President, the plaintiff Treasurer, Crandall manager, and Middleton and Bright trustees, of said company. That efforts were made to increase the local business, when it was found that there had been a misrepresentation by the defendants touching the number of machines in use in Washington, and that many of those in use had been made the subject of complaint for reasons that had been concealed from plaintiff and Crandall. That the plaintiff's suspicions being aroused by these and other facts that came to his knowledge, he made further investigations, and found that the fluid and apparatus were worthless for the uses proposed by the defendants. That as the result of the foregoing, the plaintiff became sick and distressed and financially exhausted and resigned his office of treasurer. That Bright resigned as President, and that Crandall resigned after another month. That Middleton became President and caused the plaintiff to be dropped from the Board of Trustees, that thereafter Middleton became, and ever since continued to be, the sole manager and controller of the company and all its assets and records. That in 1906 the plaintiff made an agreement with the company through its trustees.

35 by which he was to be released from his obligations, which were to be assumed by the company. That the plaintiff has performed his part of this contract. That the company being under the control of Middleton has failed to perform its part, leaving the obligations still outstanding against the plaintiff. That said obligations amount to about 13,000. That had the company fulfilled its agreement, the plaintiff's losses would amount to about Thirty Thousand dollars, whereas now he is insolvent. That the corporation itself is hopelessly insolvent. The bill then recapitulates the most substantial of the misrepresentations claimed to have been made to the plaintiff by the defendant, and avers that said certificate of Dr. Wiley was obtained upon condition that it should not be used publicly and therefore was of no value for business purposes; that Middleton was in fact interested in the patent rights and expected to receive a large part of any money that might be realized by a sale thereof to the plaintiff, and that all the acts of the defendant recited in the bill were parts of a conspiracy to deceive and defraud him, of which conspiracy the plaintiff and Crandall were the dupes and victims. That the company itself was an agency for fraud in the hands of the defendants and especially in the hands of the defendant Middleton. That all the books and papers of the company are in the possession and control of Middleton, and that the great bulk of all papers at any time possessed by the plaintiff were turned over to the defendants and cannot now be examined or produced by the

36 plaintiff and that it will be impossible for the plaintiff adequately to prove the wrongs and deceptions practiced upon him by the defendants without disclosure by them of facts within

their sole possession or of their servants and agents, pertinent to the subject matter of the bill.

By his amendment the plaintiff makes more distinct and direct his averment that Middleton deceived him into believing that Middleton had no ownership or interest in said property and patent rights, but was merely acting as agent, whereas in fact he did have such an interest and received the various amounts specifically stated in the amendment from the money paid by the plaintiff. It also makes more direct and pointed the charges as to various of the deceptions practiced upon the plaintiff by the defendant, whereby plaintiff was induced to go into the enterprise, but these are all of the same general nature as those stated in the bill. He further states "that while from such careful investigations as he has been able to make, with the evidence accessible to him, he has been led to believe and continues to believe the truth of all the foregoing averments and those of the original bill of complaint, and that the defendant Middleton has been guilty of such frauds and fraudulent representations as made him personally liable to the complainant for all his advancements, payments and losses in connection with the purchase of said patents and rights thereunder yet the complainant was not and is not sufficiently sure of the facts to make him

37 willing to begin an action at law and invoke a trial by jury; wherefore he determined to seek further enlightenment by means of disclosures to be required of the defendants." The plaintiff added the following: "The complainant avers that he was duly advised by counsel whom he consulted that being in doubt whether the facts known to him would give him a complete right of action, based upon the alleged frauds committed by the defendants, and realizing that such facts and others connected therewith were complicated and ascertainable only from an examination of books and papers in the possession of the defendants, and by disclosures as aforesaid, therefore he was entitled to the assistance of a court of equity to obtain a disclosure by the defendants, in due course, of all pertinent facts and to obtain access to such books and papers and make an examination thereof, and entitled after and in connection with such disclosure and examination to have a full and accurate accounting made by the defendants concerning all complicated and fraudulent transactions which might be disclosed, wherefore the complainant brought the original bill of complaint and now files this amendment thereof by way of addition thereto."

No service has ever been made upon defendants Blackmore and Orr, and they are not before the court. The demurrer, is interposed by the defendant Middleton and the bill is to be considered as a bill against him. It should be observed at the outset that the only relief sought is a money decree making the plaintiff whole for what he has expended in reliance upon the false representations of the defendants, and as incidental thereto, a so-called discovery. It

38 is not alleged that there is any property existing at present which represents the moneys paid by the plaintiff. No effort is made to impress any property with a trust, or to require the defendants to state what has been done with the money received by

them. Most of the money, it appears, was paid to others than the defendants. It appears that the plaintiff is still the owner of some three hundred shares of the stock of the corporation. No re-cission of any contract is demanded, no offer is made to turn over said stock, all that the plaintiff desires in the form of a final decree is money to make good the damage he has sustained. For this has he not a full, adequate and complete remedy at law? The misrepresentations and circumstances set forth in the bill are all such as would be provable in an action at law, and of course there a money judgment could be obtained. There was no trust relation between the plaintiff and the defendant, in the sense in which those words are used in equity, as the basis for relief, and there was no confidential relation in the technical sense which would throw upon the defendant, or either of them, the burden of proof. The plaintiff and Middleton were close personal and social friends, but it is not alleged that Middleton had ever acted as attorney for the plaintiff, or had ever been his confidential adviser in business matters. It is true there is an allegation that Middleton in fact had a financial and property interest in the patent rights which were the subject of the sale, and the amendment to the bill makes this allegation more positive and specific. It is alleged that Middleton himself received a part

39 of the proceeds of the sale moving from the plaintiff. It is also alleged that he represented to the plaintiff that he had no such interest, but was only an agent for making the sale. It is further alleged that he induced the plaintiff to purchase a part of the invention and the rights thereunder with a view to their both becoming interested in a corporation that should take over said invention and rights and exploit them,—not that they should form a partnership for that purpose, but that each should take a part of the stock. These are the only allegations which appear to the court to furnish anything like a ground for interference by a court of equity, in distinction from a ground which would afford the basis for an action at law; but upon careful analysis these seem to be insufficient to give equity jurisdiction. Relief is not sought upon the ground of a partnership. No accounting is sought of Middleton as a partner. No partnership relation is alleged to exist between them. The allegations just referred to are made in order to show one part of the deception that was practiced upon the plaintiff. In this respect the case is very much like *Tyler v. Moses*, 13 App. D. C. 428, and indeed in other respects the cases are remarkably similar. In that case there was an answer and proofs were taken, and the court held that it was too late, after that, to raise the question of jurisdiction, but said that aside from the question of partnership involved in that case, the objection would have been fatal if it had been taken, as this has been, upon the threshold. In the *Tyler v. Moses* case also the de-

40 fendant had posed as having no interest in the sale of the stock except by virtue of an option, whereas he was in fact the real owner of a part of it. Yet that fact was thought not to alter the case so far as the jurisdiction of equity was concerned. The court considered it as falling within *Buzard v. Houston*, 119 U. S. 347, except for the allegation of partnership. *Buzard v. Houston* is a

strong authority for the proposition that where the only relief sought is a money decree for damages occasioned by fraud and deceit, the remedy at law is adequate and exclusive. That authority is of course binding upon this court, and it is not necessary to pursue this line of reasoning further. But it is urged that in the case at bar, the circumstances of fraud are so complicated as to make the case an exception to that rule. No authority is cited that supports this proposition, and in fact the allegations of fraud are not especially complicated. The misrepresentations and circumstances are distinctly set forth in the bill, and they are only such as might in their nature be proved by proper evidence in a court of law. There are many general allegations of fraud, to be sure, but general allegations of this nature are not effectual further than they are supported by specific averments touching the facts which are conceived by the pleader to constitute the fraud, and those averments have been recited and commented upon already. *United States v. De Moines etc. Co.*, 142 U. S.

544; 16 Cyc. 231, and cases cited.

41 Furthermore, it is strongly urged that the bill seeks a discovery. The answer made to this is, first, that such discovery as is asked for, is only incidental to such relief as might be had at law and is for that reason an insufficient ground; and in the next place, that a statute now existing enables the plaintiff to secure all the discovery he is asking for by proper process at law. Code Sec. 1072. There seems to be some conflict in the authorities touching the first of these propositions, but touching the second proposition, the later cases, particularly those in the Supreme Court of the United States, seem to be with the defendant. Courts of equity are not inclined to maintain a bill merely for purposes of discovery at the present day where the statutes have afforded ample means of procuring the evidence in an action at law; and this seems to be the sound view of the matter. The defendant is entitled under the Constitution to a trial by jury of matters strictly cognizable at law. In the present case the plaintiff himself states that he does not feel sure enough of his ground to institute an action at law, and for that very reason wishes to know what the defendant will say. This is an admission that the present bill is an attempt to get the defendant committed upon various questions of fact before instituting legal proceedings, although the plaintiff does not pretend that he is ignorant of any of the matters of fact which he makes the basis of the bill. On the contrary he sets these facts forth with great particularity. There is apparently another reason why relief is sought in equity rather than at law. The misrepresentations appear to have

42 been manifest to the plaintiff as early as 1905, certainly as early as 1906, when he made an arrangement with the corporation to be relieved of his liability upon his obligations. This bill was not filed until 1910. The period of limitations upon actions of this nature is three years. Code Sec. 1265. The fact that the statute of limitations is a bar to a proceeding at law, especially when it also appears that the fraud was discovered more than three years before any proceeding was begun, certainly cannot be relied upon as a ground for equitable jurisdiction. The court has given very care-

ful consideration to this case, both by reason of the importance of the case to the plaintiff as well as to the defendant, and because a court of equity is always reluctant to sustain a demurrer to a bill which charges fraud, but it has not been able to discover any ground upon which it could support its jurisdiction consistently with the decisions which are undoubtedly binding upon this court.

Accordingly it is considered best for both parties that the demurrer be sustained, and the bill adjudged insufficient, thus enabling the plaintiff to take the opinion of the appellate court at this stage of the proceedings.

WENDELL P. STAFFORD, *Justice.*

43

Decree Sustaining Demurrer, &c.

Filed February 24, 1911.

* * * * *

This cause coming on to be heard upon the amended bill filed herein on the 24 day of December, A. D., 1910, and the demurrer of the defendant, Frank L. Middleton, filed herein on the 30 day of December, A. D. 1910, and after argument by counsel for the respective parties hereto and due consideration by the Court, it is, this 24 day of February, A. D., 1911, adjudged, ordered and decreed, that the demurrer be, and the same is hereby sustained and,

It is further adjudged, ordered and decreed that said bill as amended be and the same is hereby dismissed with costs.

By Order of the Court:

WENDELL P. STAFFORD, *Justice.*

Order Allowing Appeal and Fixing Bond.

Filed March 17, 1911.

* * * * *

From the final decree in this cause the plaintiff by his attorney now here in open court notes an appeal to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, and upon motion of counsel the amount of the appeal bond for costs not to operate as a supersedeas is hereby fixed at \$100., this 17th day of March, 1911.

44

WENDELL P. STAFFORD, *Justice.*

Memorandum.

March 18, 1911.—Bond on appeal for \$100 approved.

Order for Transcript of Record on Appeal.

Filed April 7, 1911.

* * * * *

The Clerk of said Court will please prepare the transcript of record on appeal including therein the following, viz (1) Original Bill,

(2) Demurrer filed May 3, 1910, (3) Order of Nov. 18, 1910 sustaining demurrer &c., (4) Amendment of Bill (5) Demurrer filed Dec. 30, 1910, (6) Opinion filed Feb'y 20, 1911, (7) Decree of Feb'y 24, 1911, dismissing bill, &c., (8) Order filed March 17, 1911, fixing amount of appeal bond, &c. (9) Memo. showing filing of appeal bond. (10) This order.

LORENZO A. BAILEY,
Attorney for Plaintiff.

45

Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
District of Columbia, ss:


I, John R. Young, Clerk of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, hereby certify the foregoing pages numbered from 1 to 44, both inclusive, to be a true and correct transcript of the record according to directions of counsel herein filed, copy of which is made part of this transcript, in cause No. 29,257 in Equity, wherein Samuel W. Curriden, is Complainant and Frank L. Middleton, et al. are Defendants, as the same remains upon the files and of record in said Court.

In testimony whereof, I hereunto subscribe my name and affix the seal of said Court at the City of Washington, in said District, this 3rd day of May, 1911.

[Seal Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.]

JOHN R. YOUNG, *Clerk.*

Endorsed on cover: District of Columbia Supreme Court. No. 2293. Samuel W. Curriden, appellant, vs. Frank L. Middleton et al. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia. Filed May 3, 1911. Henry W. Hodges, clerk.



COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
FILED

SEP-12-1911

Henry W. Stead
Court of Appeals, District of Columbia
Vol. 116

OCTOBER TERM, 1911.

No. 2293.

SAMUEL W. CURRIDEN, APPELLANT,


vs.

FRANK L. MIDDLETON, ET AL.

BRIEF AND ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL FOR
APPELLANT.

WM. E. CHANDLER,
LORENZO A. BAILEY,
Counsel for Appellant.

PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS, WASHINGTON, D. C.



Court of Appeals, District of Columbia

OCTOBER TERM, 1911.

No. 2293.

SAMUEL W. CURRIDEN, APPELLANT,

vs.

FRANK L. MIDDLETON, ET AL.

BRIEF AND ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT.

In the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, in equity, this cause was heard upon amended bill of complaint and demurrer thereto, whereupon that Court by final decree, accompanied by a written opinion filed, sustained the demurrer and dismissed the amended bill with costs, from which decree the plaintiff prosecutes this appeal and, as the grounds of his appeal, says he is advised that the Court below erred as follows:

1. In holding (Rec., 24) that the statutory provision in

Sec. 1072 of the Code D. C. supersedes or curtails the right to discovery in equity.

2. In holding that the plaintiff's remedy at law is adequate and exclusive.

3. In sustaining the demurrer and in dismissing the amended bill.

ARGUMENT, POINTS AND AUTHORITIES.

The Court below appears to base its decision upon its view of the decision in *Buzard vs. Houston*, 119 U. S., 347, which view is thus stated in the opinion (Rec., 23, 24): "*Buzard vs. Houston* is a strong authority for the proposition that where the only relief sought is a money decree for damages occasioned by fraud and deceit, the remedy at law is adequate and exclusive."

That proposition is clearly erroneous in the light of the later decision in *Tyler vs. Savage*, 143 U. S., 79; 36 L. Ed., 82, 88, 89, where the only relief sought was a "money decree for damages occasioned by fraud and deceit," and the Court awarded relief by just such a decree because, by reason of the circumstances of the case, the remedy at law was not adequate and exclusive. The Court, in pointing out the difference between that case and the case of *Buzard vs. Houston*, indicated that the question of equitable jurisdiction turned on the nature and circumstances of the case and not on the particular nature of the relief or the form of the decree sought.

The case at bar is wholly unlike *Buzard vs. Houston*. In that case, by deceit, the defendant induced the plaintiffs to cancel their agreement with defendant and to accept in lieu thereof an assignment from him of his contract with an insolvent third party. There appeared to be no complicated scheme of fraud, no need of discovery, and no circumstances making it more difficult for the plaintiff to

proceed at law than in equity and the Court found the legal remedy was "plain, adequate and complete;" yet that decision was not unanimous. See the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Bradley.

In *Tyler vs. Savage* (*supra*), Tyler had by misrepresentation and fraud induced the plaintiff below to invest \$10,000 in the worthless stock of the corporation of which Tyler was president, and in order to make out her case she called on him to answer specific interrogatories just as was done in the case at bar. The decree held Tyler individually liable for the \$10,000, and required him to pay it to the plaintiff with interest.

That case and the case at bar are alike in all particulars bearing on the question of equitable jurisdiction. Even with the aid of the Code D. C., Sec. 1072, the plaintiff would not have a "plain, adequate and complete" remedy at law. The case is not one for trial by jury where technical objections and impromptu rulings may exclude testimony as to facts and circumstances which in the trained mind of the chancellor would be proper material for consideration. On the other hand it is one in which complete justice may be obtained only in a court of conscience, where the defendant is required to answer fully under oath to the plaintiff's allegations and specific interrogatories, and where the chancellor may hear and consider all the testimony which the plaintiff may adduce, and may mould the decree in accordance with all the facts established by the proofs.


If the plaintiff sue at law, the burden of proof is on him to the end. In equity the defendant would be burdened to show that he had not abused the confidence of the plaintiff.

Upon the whole record, containing the pleadings, decree, and written opinion filed, the decree was erroneous and should be reversed. It should at least have been made, if

at all, without prejudice to plaintiff's right to sue at law, as stated in Buzard vs. Houston, *supra*. But it seems to be, upon the main question of jurisdiction, directly contrary to Tyler vs. Savage, *supra*, and a departure from the well established principles upon which depends the very existence of the equity court.

Respectfully submitted,

WM. E. CHANDLER,
Counsel for Appellant.
LORENZO A. BAILEY,



COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
FILED

SEP-25-1911

Henry W. Higgins
Wick

IN THE

Court of Appeals, District of Columbia.

OCTOBER TERM, 1911.

No. 2293.

SAMUEL W. CURRIDEN, APPELLANT,

vs.


FRANK L. MIDDLETON ET AL., APPELLEES.

BRIEF ON BEHALF OF APPELLEE.

E. HILTON JACKSON,

CHARLES B. CALVERT,

Attorneys for Appellees.



IN THE
Court of Appeals, District of Columbia.

OCTOBER TERM, 1911.

No. 2293.

SAMUEL W. CURRIDEN, APPELLANT,

vs.

FRANK L. MIDDLETON ET AL., APPELLEES.

BRIEF ON BEHALF OF APPELLEE.

Statement of the Case.

The appellant in his brief has so utterly failed to apprise the court of the facts as disclosed by the record that this duty devolves upon the appellee. The opinion of Mr. Justice Stafford, who heard the case below, gives the facts so clearly and succinctly that the appellee adopts this statement without reservation (R., 19-23).

"This case has been heard upon demurrer to the bill as now amended. There was a demurrer to the original bill which was sustained and the bill adjudged insufficient. Thereupon, with leave of court, the plaintiff filed amendments, and the present demurrer is to the bill as thus amended. Broadly stated, the plaintiff's claim is that the defendants have deprived him of his property by fraud and deceit, and should be ordered to restore to him the amounts of money he has paid out by reason thereof, and should be required to make a full disclosure touching all matters charged in the bill. The only decree sought is a money decree. The principal objection made to the bill under the demurrer is that the case as set forth in the bill is a proper case for an action at law for deceit, where full relief can be had, and that consequently there is no ground for the jurisdiction of a court of equity.

"The original bill sets out that in the year 1904, and for many years prior thereto, a personal friendship had existed between the plaintiff and the defendant Middleton; that Middleton was a patent attorney in active practice; that plaintiff was engaged in various other business affairs and had accumulated some thirty-five thousand dollars, and had ample financial credit. That these facts were known to Middleton; that the plaintiff had entire confidence in Middleton's loyalty as a friend and in his knowledge and skill as an attorney; that in October 1904, Middleton, through one Orr, another of the defendants, who was then a stranger to the plaintiff, brought to the attention of the plaintiff, a certain fluid called aromaform, and a certain apparatus intended as a disinfecting appliance in the use of said fluid, and made certain representations to the plaintiff touching the power and value of said fluid as a disinfectant, and touching the invention and patenting of said fluid and apparatus, and representing that Middleton was the agent of the owners of all the patents covering said fluid and apparatus, with power to make a sale of the same and the rights thereunder, and representing that there had been various complications of ownership so that up to that moment it had been

impossible to completely purchase said patent rights, and that now the opportunity to purchase the same should not be neglected. That further to engage the interest and confidence of the plaintiff, Middleton through Orr, exhibited to the plaintiff a copy of a certain letter, written and signed by Harvey W. Wiley, chemist of the Agricultural Department of the United States, which is set out in the bill, and which is to the effect that he, the said Wiley, was using one of the apparatus and that four distinct and important results were thereby secured, from which said Wiley inferred and believed that the process was useful and simple, and one that could be easily introduced at a low rate into private houses and public buildings, and would be a great benefit. That at first the plaintiff being distrustful by reason of his ignorance and want of skill in such matters declined to take any part in the enterprise, but that his objections were overcome by further representations of Middleton which are set out in the bill at considerable length, and which relate to the value of the fluid and apparatus, and the various advantages that would result from the enterprise. That yielding to the solicitations of Middleton, the plaintiff and one Crandall, a friend of the plaintiff, agreed with Middleton to purchase all of said rights, to be paid for, partly in cash and partly in stock of the company to be organized by them with a capital of five hundred thousand dollars. That in pursuance of the agreement, the company was duly incorporated. That in the same month, plaintiff paid Middleton \$1500., for which Middleton receipted as agent, and thereafter the plaintiff paid further sums and gave his note, incurring an indebtedness of some forty thousand dollars in carrying out said enterprise, and all such rights were transferred to said company. That thereafter the company attempted to engage in the business for which it had been created, namely, the manufacture and sale of the fluid and apparatus. That a building was secured by lease and one Blackmore, the inventor of the fluid and apparatus, who is also a defendant, was put in charge of the laboratory. That one Bright was made president, the plaintiff

treasurer, Crandall manager, and Middleton and Bright trustees, of said company. That efforts were made to increase the local business, when it was found that there had been a misrepresentation by the defendants touching the number of machines in use in Washington, and that many of those in use had been made the subject of complaint for reasons that had been concealed from plaintiff and Crandall. That the plaintiff's suspicions being aroused by these and other facts that came to his knowledge, he made further investigations, and found that the fluid and apparatus were worthless for the uses proposed by the defendants. That as the result of the foregoing, the plaintiff became sick and distressed and financially exhausted and resigned his office of treasurer. That Bright resigned as president, and that Crandall resigned after another month. That Middleton became president and caused the plaintiff to be dropped from the Board of Trustees, that thereafter Middleton became, and ever since continued to be, the sole manager and controller of the company and all its assets and records. That in 1906 the plaintiff made an agreement with the company through its trustees, by which he was to be released from his obligations, which were to be assumed by the company. That the plaintiff has performed his part of this contract. That the company being under the control of Middleton has failed to perform its part, leaving the obligations still outstanding against the plaintiff. That said obligations amount to about \$13,000. That had the company fulfilled its agreement, the plaintiff's losses would amount to about thirty thousand dollars, whereas now he is insolvent. That the corporation itself is hopelessly insolvent. The bill then recapitulates the most substantial of the misrepresentations claimed to have been made to the plaintiff by the defendant, and avers that said certificate of Dr. Wiley was obtained upon condition that it should not be used publicly and therefore was of no value for business purposes; that Middleton was in fact interested in the patent rights and expected to receive a large part of any money that might be realized by a sale thereof to the plaintiff, and that all the acts

of the defendant recited in the bill were parts of a conspiracy to deceive and defraud him, of which conspiracy the plaintiff and Crandall were the dupes and victims. That the company itself was an agency for fraud in the hands of the defendants and especially in the hands of the defendant Middleton. That all the books and papers of the company are in the possession and control of Middleton, and that the great bulk of all papers at any time possessed by the plaintiff were turned over to the defendants and cannot now be examined or produced by the plaintiff and that it will be impossible for the plaintiff adequately to prove the wrongs and deceptions practiced upon him by the defendants without disclosure by them of facts within their sole possession or of their servants and agents, pertinent to the subject-matter of the bill.

"By his amendment the plaintiff makes more distinct and direct his averment that Middleton deceived him into believing that Middleton had no ownership or interest in said property and patent rights, but was merely acting as agent, whereas in fact he did have such an interest and received the various amounts specifically stated in the amendment from the money paid by the plaintiff. It also makes more direct and pointed the charges as to various of the deceptions practiced upon the plaintiff by the defendant, whereby plaintiff was induced to go into the enterprise, but these are all of the same general nature as those stated in the bill. He further states 'that while from so careful investigations as he has been able to make, with the evidence accessible to him, he has been led to believe and continues to believe the truth of all the foregoing averments and those of the original bill of complaint, and that the defendant Middleton has been guilty of such frauds and fraudulent representations as made him personally liable to the complainant for all his advancements, payments and losses in connection with the purchase of said patents and rights thereunder yet the complainant was not and is not sufficiently sure of the facts to make him willing to begin an action at law and invoke a trial by jury; wherefore he de-

terminated to seek further enlightenment by means of disclosures to be required of the defendants.' The plaintiff added the following: 'The complainant avers that he was duly advised by counsel whom he consulted that being in doubt whether the facts known to him would give him a complete right of action, based upon the alleged frauds committed by the defendants, and realizing that such facts and others connected therewith were complicated and ascertainable only from an examination of books and papers in the possession of the defendants, and by disclosures as aforesaid, therefore he was entitled to the assistance of a court of equity to obtain a disclosure by the defendants, in due course, of all pertinent facts and to obtain access to such books and papers and make an examination thereof, and entitled after and in connection with such disclosure and examination to have a full and accurate accounting made by the defendants concerning all complicated and fraudulent transactions which might be disclosed, wherefore the complainant brought the original bill of complaint and now files this amendment thereof by way of addition thereto.'

"No service has ever been made upon defendants Blackmore and Orr, and they are not before the court. The demurrer is interposed by the defendant Middleton and the bill is to be considered as a bill against him. It should be observed at the outset that the only relief sought is a money decree making the plaintiff whole for what he has expended in reliance upon the false representations of the defendants, and as incidental thereto, a so-called discovery. It is not alleged that there is any property existing at present which represents the moneys paid by the plaintiff. No effort is made to impress any property with a trust, or to require the defendants to state what has been done with the money received by them. Most of the money, it appears, was paid to others than the defendants. It appears that the plaintiff is still the owner of some three hundred shares of the stock of the corporation. No rescission of any contract is demanded, no offer is made to turn over said stock; all that the plaintiff desires in the

form of a final decree is money to make good the damage he has sustained."

I.

Adequate Remedy at Law.

Analysis of this bill, therefore, discloses that it is filed to recover damages growing out of alleged fraudulent misrepresentations made by the defendant Middleton and incidentally seeks a discovery from him in respect of these misrepresentations.

The bill should not be permitted to stand in either case; first, because the plaintiff has a plain and adequate remedy at law, and, secondly, because as a bill of discovery merely it cannot stand, the information sought to be obtained thereby being equally available under ordinary legal process in an action at law.

It is manifest from a perusal of the bill that if the plaintiff should be ordered by this court to be reinstated in all his rights growing out of the alleged fraudulent misrepresentations of the defendant Middleton, the only relief he could have in this suit would be a decree for damages to be assessed by the same rules as in an action at law.

"The effect of the provisions of the Judiciary Act as often stated by this court, is that whenever a court of law is competent to take cognizance of a right and has power to proceed to a judgment which affords a plain, adequate and complete remedy, without the aid of a court of equity, the plaintiff must proceed at law, because the defendant has a constitutional right to a trial by jury.

Buzard *vs.* Houston, 119 U. S., 351.

"In case of fraud or mistake a court of the United States will not sustain a bill in equity to obtain only a decree for the payment of money by way of damages, when the like amount can be recovered at law

in an action sounding in tort or for money had and received.

Ib., 352.

Parkersburg *vs.* Brown, 106 U. S., 487, 500.

Ambler *vs.* Chateau, 107 U. S., 586.

Litchfield *vs.* Ballow, 114 U. S., 190.

"Equity has no jurisdiction in a case of a mere claim for damages for a fraudulent misrepresentation.

Story Eq. Juris., vol. 2, p. 122.

"The only case in which a court of equity would interpose to award damages is where there is no remedy at law or as incidental to some other relief as in case of specific performance.

Ib., 128.

"If, as is more than once distinctly alleged, the object of the suit is to recover damages for an unlawful and fraudulent conspiracy to cheat Ambler out of his interests in the original invention which is the subject-matter of the controversy, the remedy is clearly at law, and not in equity.

Ambler *vs.* Chateau, 107 U. S., 590.

"The mere assertion of an equity will not sustain a bill, but the case stated must show sufficient equity by the allegation of facts to satisfy the court that there is sufficient equitable element involved that cannot be availed of at law.

Pechstein *vs.* Smith, 14 App. D. C., 27.

"It is the duty of a court of equity to recognize its want of jurisdiction and give effect to it, even though the question be not raised in the pleading or argument.

Dewey Hotel Co. *vs.* U. S. Electric Light Co.,
7 App. D. C., 356.

Thompson *vs.* Ry. Co., 6 Wall., 134.

"It is a settled principle of equity jurisprudence that courts thereof have no jurisdiction to grant relief where plain and adequate remedy can be had at

law. This rule is necessarily most closely adhered to in all of the United States courts. It is declared in the Judiciary Act, in strict accord with those provisions of the Constitution which established the distinction between law and equity, and preserves the right of trial by jury in all cases at law where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars. This right is not compensated by sending issues out of chancery to be tried by jury, and is therefore to be carefully guarded from the encroachments of courts of equity."

Hess *vs.* Horton, 2 D. C. Appeals, 85.

II.

Can the Bill be Maintained for Discovery Only?

Section 1072 of the code provides:

"In an action at common law the court may, on motion, and on reasonable notice thereof, require the parties to produce books and writings in their possession or power, which contain evidence pertinent to the issue, in cases and under circumstances where they might heretofore have been compelled to produce the same by the ordinary rules of proceeding in chancery."

And in this connection the learned justice at the trial below uses the following language:

"Furthermore, it is strongly urged that the bill seeks a discovery. The answer made to this is, first, that such discovery as is asked for, is only incidental to such relief as might be had at law and is for that reason an insufficient ground; and in the next place, that a statute now existing enables the plaintiff to secure all the discovery he is asking for by proper process at law. Code, Sec. 1072. There seems to be some conflict in the authorities touching the first of these propositions, but touching the second proposition, the later cases, particularly those in the Su-

preme Court of the United States, seem to be with the defendant. Courts of equity are not inclined to maintain a bill merely for purposes of discovery at the present day where the statutes have afforded ample means of procuring the evidence in an action at law; and this seems to be the sound view of the matter. The defendant is entitled under the Constitution to a trial by jury of matters strictly cognizable at law. In the present case the plaintiff himself states that he does not feel sure enough of his ground to institute an action at law, and for that very reason wishes to know what the defendant will say. This is an admission that the present bill is an attempt to get the defendant committed upon various questions of fact before instituting legal proceedings, although the plaintiff does not pretend that he is ignorant of any of the matters of fact which he makes the basis of the bill."

A discovery being compelled upon a bill praying relief, for the purpose of enabling the plaintiff to obtain that relief, the discovery is in general incident to the relief, and a demurrer to the relief consequently extends to the discovery likewise.

Mitford and Tyler's Pl. & Pr. Eq., p. 277.
Story Eq. Pl., 570.

If, then, the complainant is not entitled under this bill to any relief against Lanahan, it is plain it cannot be maintained against them as a bill of discovery. Where a bill is filed for relief no person can be made a party to it who is unaffected by the relief, notwithstanding he might give important discovery, because as against himself discovery is needless, and as against the other parties it would be unavailing, for the discovery so obtained is only available against the answering defendant; his answer cannot be read as evidence against any other person, not even against another defendant to the same bill.

Reddington *vs.* Lanahan *et al.*, 59 Md., 437.

Discovery may not be claimed in a bill to save the expense or uncertainty in the proof of the case and may not be

used as a ground of equity jurisdiction for ulterior purposes, in which case it would be sufficient to bring any case, proper only for a court of law, into equity, to call for the discovery of facts from the defendant.

"The American courts in view of the foregoing *reductio ad absurdum* have laid down the principle that a party going into equity for discovery alone *must allege in his bill and verify the allegation by affidavit*, that he has no other means of proving his case.

Gelston *vs.* Hoyt, 1 Johns. Ch., 543.

Bank of U. S. *vs.* Biddle, 3 Pars., Ch. 31.

Lyons *vs.* Miller, 6 Gratt., 427, 428.

"The only distinct ground of equity jurisdiction over cases of a purely legal nature based on discovery is when the defendant has been charged with a wrong and a virtual fraud in withholding legal evidence.

Story Eq. Juris., p. 80.

(Note by Chief Justice Redfield.)

"To sustain the decree of the Chancellor it has also been asserted, that this is a bill of discovery; and although the complainant's claim be in its nature exclusively cognizable at law, yet that the Chancery Court, for the purpose of the discovery, having obtained jurisdiction over the case, is competent to give full and final relief upon the whole subject-matter. The decree cannot be supported on this ground, for various reasons; but few of which we deem it necessary to state. In the first place the bill has neither the form or substance of such a bill of discovery. It does not allege that the facts of which the discovery is sought are indispensable as proof to the complainants, and that they are unable to prove them by other testimony."

Oliver *vs.* Palmer *et al.*, 11 H. & J., 445.

III.

The Bill is Barred by the Statute of Limitations and the Appellant Has Lost His Remedy Even at Law by Reason of His Own Laches.

The bill was filed on April 5, 1910, and the fraud as alleged in paragraph 6 of said bill was apparently consummated on or about October 27, 1904, the statutory period under the Code for actions of deceit or sounding in tort being three years. If the appellant seeks to avoid the operation of the statute on the ground that the alleged fraud was not discovered by him until after that time, the bill wholly fails in this respect also because there is no definite allegation as to when the fraud was discovered. The inference, however, is conclusive that it was prior to January 16, 1906, at which time the appellant entered into an arrangement with the company whereby the company undertook to exonerate him from his liability existing at that time. Taking this latter date as the time when the alleged fraud was discovered, more than three years elapsed before the filing of the bill.

Equity will treat a right or claim as barred by limitations when not sued upon within the statutory period prescribed for actions on a legal right or claim of the same nature.

Willard vs. Wood, 1 App. D. C.

Sis v. Boarman, 11 App. D. C., 116.

Equitable powers will not be exercised to discover whether one has been wronged, when, with full knowledge of the facts, he has allowed the bar of the statute to arise, and has slept upon his rights until such a situation has arisen as to render it inequitable to afford him relief.

Baker vs. Cummings, 169 U. S., 189, reversing 4 App. D. C., 230, and 8 App. D. C., 515.

If it appear on the face of the pleadings that the claim is barred by the statute of limitations, the defect may be taken advantage of by demurrer.

Commack vs. Carpenter, 3 App. D. C., 219.

Mercantile National Bank vs. Carpenter, 101 U. S., 567.

Rhode Island vs. Massachusetts, 15 Pet., 233.

Coddington vs. Penn., &c., R. Co., 103 U. S., 409.

Kindall vs. U. S., 107 U. S., 123.

Chenning Canal Bank vs. Lowery, 93 U. S., 72.

So with laches.

McCartney vs. Fletcher, 10 App. D. C., 572.

Spiedel vs. Henrici, 120 U. S., 377.

Bryan vs. Kales, 134 U. S., 126.

Lansdale vs. Smith, 106 U. S., 391.

IV.

The Averments of Fraud in the Bill are Insufficient to Compel the Defendant to Make Answer.

An examination of these averments discloses that the appellant is relying upon two acts of misrepresentation on the part of the defendant, to-wit:

(a) Misrepresentations as to the germicide or disinfectant qualities of the fluid.

(b) Misrepresentation as to standing offer of \$5,000 for use of patent rights in Minneapolis and St. Paul.

(a) As to the alleged misrepresentation in respect of the germicide or disinfectant properties of the fluid, it appears from the bill, paragraphs 3 and 4, that the appellee Middleton, not being a chemist himself, was relying upon any representation he may have made as to the properties of the fluid upon a letter of Harvey W. Wiley, chief chemist of the Agriculture Department, and also "that the patentee, the de-

fendant Blackmore, stood very high in his profession as a chemist," as alleged in paragraph 4. The letter from Dr. Wiley distinctly states on page 2 of said bill that the invention has disinfectant properties, "disinfecting or germicide power," being used by the appellant in paragraph 18 (*d*) of his bill as interchangeable terms. It is significant that it is nowhere alleged in the bill that the statement alleged to have been made by Dr. Wiley in said letter was not in fact made or that Dr. Wiley was not competent to pass upon the disinfecting properties of the fluid in question. The appellant also utterly fails to aver anything derogatory of the professional character of Blackmore as a chemist, who he says was being sought by the appellee as one "who stood very high in his profession as chemist." Besides it would appear from a perusal of this bill that the appellant became an officer of the company, which was incorporated about October, 1904, and was associated with said Blackmore "as trustee and consulting chemist of the company." Bill, paragraph 8.

Is not the conclusion from the foregoing inevitable that in respect of the germicide properties of fluid the appellant Curriden was relying not upon Middleton, who was known by him not to be a chemist but a patent attorney, but rather upon the statements of such chemical experts as Wiley and Blackmore. Nor does it conclusively appear from the averments of the bill that the fluid was worthless, all the light had on this subject being contained in paragraph 11 to the effect that the appellant "was compelled to set on foot inquiries and to have tests made concerning the Aromaform, the result of which proved that the fluid, with the apparatus, was wholly ineffective and utterly worthless for the uses for which it was designed." It does not appear from this averment that these tests were adequate or that the parties making them had any greater knowledge of the properties of the fluid than Blackmore and Wiley, who were avowedly put forward by Middleton according to the averments of the bill

as being the ones upon whom he himself relied in making representations as to the disinfectant or germicide powers of the fluid.

From the foregoing the legitimate conclusions may be drawn:

1. That appellant was not misled by any misrepresentations made in this regard by appellee, but rather relied upon the expert knowledge of those who were referred to by Middleton as experts in matters of this kind.

2. That appellant had equal means with appellee of ascertaining the alleged germicide properties of the fluid before he made any investment whatever in the same.

It is said by Mr. Chief Justice Alvey in *Security Investment Co. vs. Garrett*, 3 App. D. C., 76,

"If the motive and design of an act may be traced to an honest and legitimate source equally as to a corrupt one, the former ought to be preferred. And though a representation made by a party sought to be charged was at the time untrue, yet if the party was ignorant of it, and, so far as appears from the evidence, believed that it was true, he is not responsible for the loss sustained by the other party in trusting to such representation."

Again, Mr. Justice Shepard in *Clark vs. Harmer*, 9 App. D. C., 10, relying upon the case of *Slaughter vs. Gerson*, 13 Wall., 379, used the following language:

"It is only where the means of knowledge are at hand and are equally available to both parties, that a purchaser cannot be heard to say that he was deceived by a vendor's misrepresentations."

b. It is also significant that upon the organization of the company the appellant Curriden and his friend Joseph E. Crandall were respectively the treasurer and general manager of the same and while they were so acting in these im-

portant official positions "an elaborate prospectus was prepared and printed" by the company. In paragraph 11 it is alleged that certain ^{statements} prospective purchasers of rights ~~as confirmation of statements~~ were made with the consent and concurrence of the appellant and his associate Crandall, both important officers in the company, who, he alleges in his bill, were duped by the appellee. It is also stated in paragraph 10 of the bill that the sale of certain New England rights would have been consummated but for the alleged misrepresentations made as to the fluid and the apparatus. If, therefore, it is apparent from a perusal of the bill these representations were made by Middleton *before* the company was organized, and by Curriden and his associate Crandall *after* the company was organized, relying, as they all did, upon the chemists Blackmore and Wiley, then it necessarily follows that Middleton, assuming these representations to be false, was misled equally with Curriden and Crandall, and that they all after the organization of the company joined in a prospectus which renewed these representations with a view to interesting Boston parties in certain territorial rights. Surely any failure to consummate a sale of this sort by the company was as much due to appellant and his associate Crandall as it was to appellee, who at the time was only one of the trustees of the company.

Tyler vs. Savage, 143 U. S., 79:

The reference in appellant's brief to the above case, which is the only authority relied upon for a reversal of the decree of the court below, is so glaringly erroneous that a brief analysis of that case is deemed important. The appellant in his brief on page 2 says the only relief sought there was "a money decree for damages occasioned by fraud and deceit."

In Tyler vs. Savage the corporation involved was also named as defendant along with the party charged with deceit in procuring the plaintiff therein to purchase stock in the defendant company.

The Supreme Court in its opinion used the following:

"The bill further prayed for an account of the assets and debts of the company; that the assets be realized as quickly as possible and the funds arising therefrom be paid to its creditors; that the plaintiff's claim to be repaid the money she was induced to pay for the stock issued to her, with interest thereon, be established and be made a debt of the company, and payment of the same be decreed to her; that an injunction be granted, restraining the company and its officers and agents from managing or interfering in its affairs; that a receiver be appointed to take charge of its property and effects; and administer them under the direction of the court; and that general relief be granted and all orders made that the nature of the case might require and to the court might seem meet."

For the foregoing reasons it is respectfully submitted the decree of the court below should be affirmed with costs.

Respectfully submitted,

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